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Corruption adversely affects various aspects of economic activity, including 
international trade. As corruption affects international trade in a number of ways, 
various countries and international organisations have made co-ordinated efforts to 
effectively control corruption in general and in the context of international trade. 
Despite the World Trade Organization‟s role as a body for making and enforcing 
international trade rules, it has not actively participated in the fight against corruption in 
the trade arena.  
This paper explores why the World Trade Organization has made no anti-corruption 
initiatives and provides a review of the current role that is played by the organization in 
the international anti-corruption movement, through its existing framework. The study 
also includes a review of the different instruments put in place by other organisations 
and countries that have actively participated in combating corruption in international 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I. Research problem and background 
Corruption has been narrowly defined as “the abuse of public resources for 
personal gain”.1 It is regarded as one of the main obstacles to undertaking business in 
world markets.2 It has also been described as, among other things, the primary threat to 
sustainable economic development.3   
Generally, corruption is said to hamper free trade.4 In small income countries, in 
which a large share of government revenue is collected through customs duties, corrupt 
customs officials reduce trade and deprive the government of a substantial amount of 
revenue.5 As trade is the main driving force behind economic growth in these countries, 
it is easy to see why corruption is a cause for concern in the realm of international 
trade.6  
It has been suggested that bribery and corruption became an international issue 
in the mid 1970‟s as a result of the scandals involving pay-offs to foreign government 
officials by a number of companies from the United States of America (US).7 In 
response to these scandals, Congress (the legislature) enacted the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) which criminalized the act of bribing foreign government 
officials in order to obtain business.8 Subsequently, US businesses and government 
officials began to press for the enactment of similar legislation abroad, bilaterally as 
well as internationally.9 They pressed for such reforms in forums such as the United 
                                                          
1 Dhu Haur Tang „Corruption And International Trade: An Empirical Study On Large East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries And Comparative Politics Of Corruption‟ (2010) UCLA Undergraduate Journal 
Of Economics 133. 
2 Anderson Mccoullier as stated by Susanna Thede and Nils-ake Gustafson „The Multifaceted Impact of 
Corruption on International Trade‟ (2012) 35(5) The World Economy 651.  
3 „The OECD Fights Corruption‟ available at http://www.oecd.org, accessed on 4 June 2014. 
4
 Eelke de Jong & Christian Bogmans „Does corruption discourage international trade‟ (2007) 27 
European Journal of Political Economy 385. 
5 Ibid at 385. 
6 Dhu Haur Tang „Corruption And International Trade: An Empirical Study On Large East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries And Comparative Politics Of Corruption‟ (2010) UCLA Undergraduate Journal 
Of Economics 133. 
7 Kenneth W. Abbot „Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of corruption and bribery‟ (2001) 
4(2) Journal of International Economic Law 275. 
8 Act of 1977. 
9 Kenneth W. Abbot „Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of corruption and bribery‟ (2001) 
4(2) Journal of International Economic Law 275.  
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Nations (UN) and the Organization on Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), in the fear that the FCPA would create a competitive disadvantage for US 
business in markets affected by corruption.10  
During the 1990‟s, various international organizations began to adopt 
conventions and other instruments specifically designed to control corruption and 
bribery in international business, to the exclusion of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).11 It is suggested that reforms to reduce corruption especially in international 
business, will require trade law reforms, hence the significance of the role of the WTO 
in fighting trade-related corruption.12   
On the one hand, corruption is not an issue that would ordinarily be dealt with 
by an organization such as the WTO. On the other hand, the WTO has, from its 
inception, dealt with issues that do not necessarily fall under the traditional subject 
matter of international trade law. This is particularly because of the connection between 
such issues and international trade.13 An example of this is intellectual property rights.14 
Corruption, like intellectual property rights, is an issue that does not, on the face of it, 
fall under the traditional subject matter of international trade law.15 However, the 
connection that exists between corruption and international trade suggests that the WTO 
should not continue to be a mere onlooker in the international anti-corruption 
movement. 
 
II. Aim of the study 
This thesis seeks to develop an understanding of the relationship between 
corruption and international trade and the detrimental effects that corruption tends to 
have on trade. The relationship between corruption and international trade is neither 
                                                          
10Kenneth W. Abbot „Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of corruption and bribery‟ (2001) 
4(2) Journal of International Economic Law 275. 
11 Ibid at 275. 
12 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight against Corruption (2005) 
12. 
13 Kenneth W. Abbot „Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the case of corruption and bribery‟ (2001) 
4(2) Journal of International Economic Law 279. 
14 Ibid at 282. 
15 Ibid at 282. 
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clear nor unambiguous.16 This thesis will therefore look to provide clarity on the 
relationship between the two multifaceted phenomena by looking at some of the 
theories on how corruption influences international trade. 
Furthermore, the thesis will look into the efforts to combat corruption and other 
illicit practices by various international organizations to date. It will also look into the 
WTO‟s failure to include the fight against corruption on its agenda, despite the 
organizations role in dealing with rules of trade and the connection between corruption 
and international trade.    
Moreover, this thesis will address the question as to whether it is necessary for 
the WTO to have rules that specifically address corruption because of its impact on 
international trade. In addressing this question, a number of the WTO agreements will 
be discussed. This will assist in determining whether the WTO should play a more 
active role or whether it has sufficient, existing rules that can help members to 
effectively counter corruption. A number of theories about why the WTO has so far not 
taken any steps to make rules that explicitly address corruption will also be outlined. 
Although corruption does not fall within the traditional scope of issues dealt 
with by the WTO -an organization primarily aimed at dealing with rules of trade - there 
seems to be a sufficiently noteworthy linkage between corruption and international 
trade that could warrant intervention by the WTO. 
 
III. Methodology 
The research methodology used in this thesis entails a literature review, relying 
mainly on primary and secondary sources such as international conventions, treaties, 
declarations, legislation, case law as well as books and journal articles. Various credible 
internet sources, working papers and publications will also be considered. The literature 
in question relates to the issue of corruption as a social evil and the relevant 
international instruments put in place by various organizations to combat it and the role 
that the WTO has played in this regard.   
                                                          






Although this study explores some scholarly theories on how corruption 
influences international trade, the thesis does not provide a detailed economic analysis 
of the impact of corruption on international trade. Furthermore, the thesis does not look 
into the theories on how international trade can influence corruption. Moreover, the 
thesis does not provide an account of the different causes of corruption. 
 
V. Structure 
The thesis is divided into five interrelated chapters; each addressing specific 
issues. The current chapter is the introduction. Chapter 2 comprises the meaning of 
corruption, the relationship between corruption and international trade and the various 
theories regarding how corruption has an impact on international trade. Chapter 3 
comprises an account of the need for coherent anti-corruption strategies on several 
inroads, including nationally and internationally. It also provides an overview of some 
of the international and national efforts that have taken place to combat corruption to 
date. Chapter 4 comprises an examination of the role of the WTO and its trade rules in 
the fight against corruption and their effectiveness thereof. Finally, chapter 5 concludes 




C HAPTER 2: CORRUPTION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely recognized that effective efforts are necessary to combat and avoid 
corruption and bribery in all countries in order to ensure an improved international 
business environment, to enhance fairness and competitiveness in international 
commercial transactions and also to promote transparent and accountable governance 
and economic development.17 The intervention by various international actors in the 
global anti-corruption movement is therefore unsurprising as there is no country that is 
immune from corruption.18  
Just as corruption is linked to political, economic and social factors, it is also 
linked to trade.19 However, any such link is neither straightforward nor clear.20 This 
chapter seeks to highlight the various theories on the way in which corruption 
negatively impacts on international trade; the chapter will also look briefly at some 
claims that corruption may have a positive rather than a negative impact on trade. These 
theories are worth exploring in order to get a clearer understanding of the link between 
the two phenomena.  
It would therefore follow that an analysis of the relationship between corruption 
and international trade requires, in the first place, an understanding of the term 
“corruption”. This chapter will also provide a discussion of the meaning of corruption 
and some of the various forms that it can take. Furthermore, the reasons why the 
negative impact of corruption on trade is an important issue, as well as the main 
concerns that arise with regards to the negative impact of corruption on international 
trade will be outlined. 
 
 
                                                          
17 UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, 1997.  
18 „Corruption and Bribery: Trade and Investment impacts0‟ available at http://www.controlbae.org.uk 
accessed on 1 July 2014. 
19 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight against Corruption (2005) 
6. 
20 Ibid at 1. 
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II. THE MEANING OF CORRUPTION 
There is a vast amount of literature on the meaning of corruption.21 In most 
international discussions, corruption has been the concept that has been used to refer to 
all or most types of integrity violations or unethical behaviour.22  The working 
definition of corruption used by Transparency International is „the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain‟.23 This definition applies to instances of corruption in both the 
private and public sector. Public corruption can therefore be defined as „the abuse of 
public office for private gain‟.24  
Within the context of international trade a distinction is usually drawn between 
domestic and cross-border corruption. It has been suggested that countries that have 
serious domestic corruption problems are more likely to be vulnerable to cross-border 
forms as well.25 This is because countries with serious domestic corruption problems 
have corrupt officials and firms that engage in cross-border corruption.26 Cross-border 
corruption, of necessity, requires the co-operation of these corrupt officials to facilitate 
these schemes.27 Thus, in the absence of corrupt local officials to facilitate these 
schemes, cross-border corruption would not take place.28  
A distinction is usually also drawn between demand-side and supply-side 
corruption. The former refers to an officials request for payment in exchange for his 
favourable action and the latter refers to the offer of payment by someone who is not an 
official but is seeking favourable treatment by the official.29  This form of corruption is 
referred to as bribery and is the most likely to occur in the context of international trade. 
                                                          
21  Krista Nadakaukaren Schefer „Corruption and the WTO legal system‟ (2009) 43(4) Journal of World 
Trade 7. 
22 Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Huberts Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement (2002) 4. 
23 Transparency International „What we do‟ available at http://www.transparency.org accessed on 6 
October 2014. 
24 Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Huberts Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement (2002) 4. 
25 Michael Johnston „Cross-Border Corruption: Points of Vulnerability and Challenges for Reform‟ in 
Sahr J. Kpundeh et al (eds) Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries 
(1998) 14. 
26
 Ibid at 14. 
27 Ibid at 14. 
28 Ibid at 14. 




Corruption can however take various other forms. Some of the most common forms of 
corruption include Bribery, Favouritism, Nepotism, Embezzlement and Extortion.  
Furthermore, corruption can take place at various levels. For instance, corrupt 
practices of lower level officials and state employees are referred to as bureaucratic 
corruption or petty corruption whereas corrupt practices of high-level officials and 
policy-makers are referred to as grand corruption.30 
Identifying the particular forms and levels at which corrupt practices take place 
is important for understanding the effect that such practices can have on international 
trade transactions. This is because different forms of corruption tend to have different 
effects on trade. 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
As previously mentioned, the link between corruption and international trade is 
neither clear nor unambiguous.31 There exists a large amount of literature on the various 
ways in which corruption can affect international trade, however, the literature and 
empirical evidence on this topic have mixed results. Some of these theories will be 
outlined in this chapter. 
In much of the corruption literature, border corruption has been identified as 
having particularly trade restrictive implications compared to corruption in non-border 
locations.32 It is easy to see why corruption at the border can have a trade restrictive 
impact. However international trade transactions involve many activities that do not 
occur at the border but can be subject to corruption and can subsequently affect the 
trade outcome.33 Nevertheless, the primary focus of this chapter will be on bureaucratic 
corruption by customs and other government officials at the border.  
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31
 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight against Corruption (2005) 
1. 
32 Susanna Thede and Nils-ake Gustafson „The Multifaceted Impact of Corruption on International Trade‟ 




Although there are a wide range of theories concerning the ways in which 
corruption can affect international trade both positively and negatively. This chapter 
will focus mainly on the negative effects that corruption can have on trade volumes, 
trade reform and trade liberalization and will provide a brief discussion of each 
instance.  
 
(i) Corruption affects trade volumes 
It has been suggested that corruption may hinder trade flows by making trade 
transactions more costly.34 Furthermore, corruption tends to have a detrimental impact 
on the trade volumes in corrupt countries because honest traders would prefer to do deal 
with countries that are relatively corruption-free.35 Similarly, the corrupt agents prefer 
to do business with corruptible traders and this works to the disadvantage of those who 
trade honestly.36 An illustration of this is an instance where a US-power generation 
company lost a $320 million contract to a Japanese company in the Middle-east because 
the American company refused to pay a $3 million bribe that was demanded by the 
officials in charge.37 There have also been reports by international companies based in 
the UK that they have lost business opportunities to corrupt competitors.38 
Unsurprisingly, firms that are willing to engage in corrupt practices therefore gain a 
competitive advantage.39 A recent illustration of this is the scandal over the bribery of 
foreign public officials by three different subsidiaries of the multinational computing 
company Hewlett-Packard, for the purposes of gaining lucrative contracts.40  
                                                          
34
 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight Against Corruption (2005) 
11. 
35 Ibid at 11. 
36 Susanna Thede and Nils-ake Gustafson „The Multifaceted Impact of Corruption on International Trade‟ 
(2012) 35(5) The World Economy 653. 
37 Dana Milbank „Greasing Wheels: How US concerns compete in countries where bribes flourish‟ 
available at http://www.apnewsarchive.org accessed on 26 August 2014. 
38 „Corruption and Bribery: Trade and Investment impacts‟ available at http://www.controlbae.org.uk 
accessed on 1 July 2014. 
39 Dhu Haur Tang „Corruption And International Trade: An Empirical Study On Large East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries And Comparative Politics Of Corruption‟ (2010) UCLA Undergraduate Journal 
Of Economics 134. 
40 Juliette Garside „Hewlett-Packard to pay $108m to settle scandal over bribery of public officials‟ 
available at http://www.theguardian.com accessed on 26 August 2014. 
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A further illustration that is worth noting is the Strategic Defence Procurement 
Package, widely known as „The Arms Deal‟ which is currently the subject of a judicial 
commission in South Africa. The arms deal involved, among others, President Jacob 
Zuma (the then Deputy President) and his financial advisor at the time, Mr. Shabir 
Shaik.41 It was alleged that Mr. Shaik arranged for corrupt payments to be made to 
President Zuma in exchange for his co-operation in promoting Mr. Shaik's business 
interests.42 It was alleged that the French company Thomson CSF was sceptical about 
including Mr. Shaik as their business partner in their bid for arms deal contracts because 
he did not have any influence on the African National Congress (ANC) leadership. As a 
result, Mr. Shaik requested President Zuma to meet with the executives of Thomson 
CSF, to reassure them of Mr. Shaik's good standing with the ANC.43 Mr.Shaik 
thereafter became a major shareholder of Thomson‟s South African company and the 
company was subsequently granted one of the most lucrative subcontracts awarded to 
the participants of the arms deal.44 This contract pertained to combat suites for navy 
ships.45 It has thus been suggested that corruption by officials in a trading partner‟s 
territory can in some instances enhance rather than hinder export trade in countries 
where there are foreign firms that are willing to pay bribes.46  
There have been arguments that corruption has a positive rather than a negative 
effect on trade volumes, particularly in those countries with low quality institutions, 
going so far as suggesting that it „greases the wheels of commerce‟ because the payment 
of bribes speeds up the processes thus allowing clients to avoid bureaucratic delays.47 
The argument is therefore that inefficient bureaucracy acts as an unwieldy obstacle that 
                                                          
41 John Hatchard Combating Corruption – Legal Approaches to Supporting Good Governance and 
Integrity in Africa (2014) 156. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Andrew Feinstein After the Party: A Personal and Political Journey Inside the ANC (2007) 291. 
44 Ibid at 291. 
45 Ibid at 291; It later transpired that a South African company, CCII Systems Operations (Pty) Ltd, had 
lost the bid to Thomson CSF despite CCII Systems Operations having been the preferred option of the 
navy. 
46 Dhu Haur Tang „Corruption And International Trade: An Empirical Study On Large East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries And Comparative Politics Of Corruption‟ (2010) UCLA Undergraduate Journal 
Of Economics 155. 
47 Eelke de Jong & Erwin Udo Is corruption detrimental to international trade? (Unpublished Economics 
Thesis, Radboud University Nijomegan, 2005) 2. 
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bribes or so-called „grease money‟ can easily overcome.48 However the grease theory 
has been tested and no support for it has been found.49 It has been posited that there is 
more evidence pointing to corruption being more like sand rather than grease to 
economic transactions.50 Proponents of this sand theory argue that the grease theory is 
only possible as a second best option in a malfunctioning institutional setting, pointing 
out that, among other things, corruption reduces investment especially in most 
developing countries.51 
It has also been suggested that it is the uncertainty associated with corruption 
that tends to further reduce trade volumes.52 Moreover, corruption tends to create a 
culture of inequality in international trade. This is because of its effect of providing a 
competitive advantage to those traders willing and able to pay the bribes to the 
disadvantage of the traders who are unwilling to do so. 
 
(ii) Corruption hampers trade related reform 
There have been several empirical studies confirming that corruption delays 
trade reform.53 The corrupt officials may try to ensure that a corrupt policy framework 
is put in place and maintained precisely because of its susceptibility to corruption.54 The 
procedures sought within that policy framework are those that are designed to maximize 
the number of steps and approvals required, in order to create as many opportunities as 
possible for interaction and negotiation between the traders and customs officials.55 
                                                          
48 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight against Corruption (2005) 
10. 
49 Ibid at 10. 
50 Fisman & Svensson (2001) as referenced by Nauro F Campos, Ralitza Dimoua, Ahmad Saleh IZA 
Discussion Paper 5334 Whither Corruption? A Quantitative Survey of the literature on corruption & 
growth (2010) 1.  
51 Rock & Bonnet (2004) as referenced by Nauro F Campos, Ralitza Dimoua, Ahmad Saleh IZA 
Discussion Paper 5334 Whither Corruption? A Quantitative Survey of the literature on corruption & 
growth (2010) 1. 
52 Eelke de Jong & Christian Bogmans „Does corruption discourage international trade‟ (2007) 27 
European Journal of Political Economy 386. 
53 Eelke de Jong & Erwin Udo Is corruption detrimental to international trade? (Unpublished Economics 
Thesis, Radboud University Nijomegan, 2005) 1. 
54 Krista Nadakaukaren Schefer „Corruption and the WTO legal system‟ (2009) 43(4) Journal of World 
Trade 38. 
55 Eelke de Jong & Erwin Udo Is corruption detrimental to international trade? (Unpublished Economics 
Thesis, Radboud University Nijomegan, 2005) 13. 
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However, it is worth noting that this premise relies on the existence of a link between 
the lawmakers responsible for the trade policies and those officials who benefit from the 
corruption.56  In the absence of such a link, this particular theory has no basis. 
Furthermore, since corruption implies a low quality civil service, trade reform is 
less likely to be pursued or driven by the corrupt officials that are within the 
bureaucracy.57  
 
(iii) Corruption impacts on trade liberalization  
It has been suggested that various groups with vested interests that enjoy trade 
protection are often politically powerful and likely to be successful in resisting trade 
liberalization.58 Their influence is strongest in countries with highly corrupt 
governments that are more susceptible to lobbying and therefore leads to the persistence 
of higher trade barriers in such countries, at the request of the lobbyists.59  
There is empirical evidence that corruption can lead to more protectionist 
behaviour because corruption flourishes amidst low-quality institutions and such low 
quality institutions are more open to pressure from national groups and economic actors 
to restrict foreign competition.60  
Furthermore, high trade barriers create opportunities for requesting illicit 
advantages in exchange for market access and for more favourable conditions of 
competition.61 The effect is that it reduces the regimes willingness to lower its barriers 
                                                          
56 Krista Nadakaukaren Schefer „Corruption and the WTO legal system‟ (2009) 43(4) Journal of World 
Trade 39. 
57
 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight against Corruption (2005) 
11. 
58
 Ibid at 11. 
59 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight Against Corruption (2005) 
27. 
60 Krista Nadakaukaren Schefer „Corruption and the WTO legal system‟ (2009) 43(4) Journal of World 
Trade 38. 
61 Ibid at 38. 
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in order to protect the extra sources of income that come from bribes. Thus, corrupt 
officials in general, have little incentive to reduce their trade barriers.62  
However, the theory that corruption reduces the commitment to trade 
liberalization assumes that the problem of corruption is only driven by the demand-
side.63 It has been posited that if the supply-side were also considered, there would be 
no logical reason to assume that trade liberalization would reduce the propensity of 
traders from exporting countries to continue to offer bribes.64 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF CORUPPTION 
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The negative impacts of corruption on international trade are a particular cause 
for concern because international trade benefits the world economy as a whole. Trade 
liberalization stimulates economic growth and efficiency by allowing producers to 
exploit areas in which they have a comparative advantage over foreign producers and 
also by reducing their costs.65 It has been posited that corruption acts as a “hidden 
tariff” and is therefore a barrier to trade.66 Impediments to trade limit these benefits of 
international trade and it would therefore follow that by hindering free trade, corruption 
(a hidden tariff) has the effect of limiting economic growth and efficiency.67  
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, in some low income countries, a 
relatively large share of government revenue is collected through customs duties and as 
                                                          
62 Swedish National Board of Trade (Project 100-457-05) Trade and the Fight Against Corruption (2005) 
1. 
63 Krista Nadakaukaren Schefer „Corruption and the WTO legal system‟ (2009) 43(4) Journal of World 
Trade 40. 
64 Ibid at 40. 
65 Arnold C. Harberger „Trade and Economic Growth, Part I‟ available at http://www.ncpa.org accessed 
on 30 August 2014. 
66 Dhu Haur Tang „Corruption And International Trade: An Empirical Study On Large East Asian Newly 
Industrializing Countries And Comparative Politics Of Corruption‟ (2010) UCLA Undergraduate Journal 
Of Economics134. 
67 Arnold C. Harberger „Trade and Economic Growth, Part I‟ available at http://www.ncpa.org accessed 
on 30 August 2014. 
13 
 
a result, the governments of highly corrupt countries are deprived of a substantial 
amount of revenue by corrupt customs officials.68  
Moreover, one of the central purposes of international trade is to obtain access to 
foreign markets in which to do business; however, corrupt practices have the effect of 
degrading these markets.69  
A wide range of economic empirical research has shown a direct link between 
high levels of corruption and low levels of foreign direct investment.70 This would 
suggest that foreign investors are deterred from doing business in those markets in 
which corruption thrives and it would therefore have a detrimental effect on the 
economies of highly corrupt countries in the long run.71 This negative impact of 
corruption on foreign direct investment was thus acknowledged by the former UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan who noted that „corruption hurts the poor 
disproportionately […] by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a 
governments ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and 
discouraging foreign investment and aid.”72 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As pointed out in the discussion above, the link between corruption and 
international trade is not entirely clear and much of the literature on the subject is 
mixed. There are various forms that corruption can take and as a result the extent to 
which corruption negatively impacts trade volumes, trade liberalization and the reform 
of trade rules and practices is dependent on the form it takes and the level at which the 
corrupt practices take place. There are various international trade implications 
surrounding corruption and this illustrates that corruption indeed goes far beyond the 
misbehaviour of the actors involved in as far as it limits the benefits of international 
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trade by impeding economic growth and efficiency. It is on this basis that the issue of 




CHAPTER 3: GLOBAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT TRADE-RELATED 
CORRUPTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As previously pointed out, there is no country that is immune from corruption 
and it therefore comes as no surprise that there has been intervention by various 
international actors across the globe, taking part in the anti-corruption movement.73 
Various international organizations have taken steps to combat and minimize instances 
of corruption in international business and commercial transactions, to the exclusion of 
the WTO.74 However, despite inaction by the WTO the importance of addressing 
corruption can easily be demonstrated through this global movement that has occurred, 
to combat corruption.   
This chapter comprises an account of the need for coherent anti-corruption 
strategies on several inroads, including on a national and international level.75 It will 
also provide an overview of a number of organisations that have been involved in the 
anti-corruption movement and some national and international instruments that have 
been put in place to combat corruption so far.  
The international organizations that form the primary focus of this discussion 
are the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
The corresponding instruments put in place by these organizations to combat 
corruption are the UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in Commercial 
Transactions; the UN Convention against Corruption; the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
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and the SADC Protocol against Corruption.76 These are the main instruments that will 
be focused on in the course of the discussion. 
The chapter will also provide a brief overview of the national efforts to combat 
corruption in different jurisdictions. The primary focus in this regard will be on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the United States; and the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA Act) of South Africa. Furthermore, this 
section will outline the various enforcement mechanisms provided for by the relevant 
Acts in the different jurisdictions. 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT TRADE-RELATED 
CORRUPTION 
It has been suggested that attempting to fight corruption only within national 
economies and political boundaries is ineffective.77 One of the reasons for this is that 
when national governments attempt to confront the problem of corruption; their efforts 
are often undermined by a lack of infrastructure and finite resources.78 Furthermore, 
corruption in one country can easily become a regional or global issue.79 This becomes 
the case, for instance, when economic actors engage in cross-border corruption in order 
to obtain unfair advantages over their competitors in foreign markets.80 The domestic 
competitors could be driven out of business as a result of those corrupt practices.81 This, 
therefore, suggests that there is a need to develop anti-corruption strategies on both a 
national and international level in order to effectively combat corruption.  
When corruption became an international issue, numerous organizations 
responded by adopting conventions and other instruments designed to control bribery 
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and corruption in international business.82 There was a widespread and rapid adoption 
of anti-bribery and anti-corruption principles by a diverse set of institutions.83 Among 
these institutions are the UN and the OECD; both of which have put in place 
conventions in which fighting corruption in international commercial transactions is the 
central focus. These instruments will now be discussed below, followed by a brief 
discussion of the anti-corruption instrument created under the auspices of SADC.  
 
(i) The United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in 
International Commercial Transactions 
The UN declaration against corruption and bribery in international commercial 
transactions (hereafter referred to as „the UN declaration‟) was adopted in 1997.84 It 
includes rules and measures that countries can incorporate into their national legislation 
and implement to combat corruption.85  
The UN declaration seeks to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in 
an effective and co-ordinated manner, within the territories of member states.86 Articles 
2 and 3 of the UN declaration provide a comprehensive definition of the term „bribery‟ 
stating that it includes the following elements: 
“The offer, promise or giving of any payment, gift or other advantage, 
directly or indirectly, by any private or public corporation […] to any 
public official or elected representative of another country as undue 
consideration for performing or refraining from the performance of that 
official's or representative's duties in connection with an international 
commercial transaction; [and]  
The soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving, directly or 
indirectly, by any public official or elected representative of a State 
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from any private or public corporation […] from another country of any 
payment, gift or other advantage, as undue consideration for 
performing or refraining from the performance of that official's or 
representative's duties in connection with an international commercial 
transaction.”87 
The declaration, although not binding, was a significant step in addressing the 
issue of corruption. 
 
(ii) The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
Another significant development by the UN General Assembly was the adoption 
of the UN Convention against Corruption (hereafter referred to as the „UNCAC‟) which 
came into force on 14 December 2005.88 The General Assembly acknowledged in the 
UNCAC that corruption was no longer a local matter but a transnational one that 
affected all societies and economies thus making international co-operation to prevent 
and control it, particularly essential.89 Furthermore, it acknowledged that the adoption 
of the UNCAC would send a clear message that the international community was 
determined to prevent and control corruption.90  
The UNCAC generally covers various facets of corruption.91 It also particularly 
addresses corruption in the realm of international business. The UNCAC contributes to 
the fight against trade-related corruption through a number of provisions. For instance, 
Article 16 of the UNCAC requires State Parties to criminalize the bribery of foreign 
public officials in the context of international business.92 Under this Article states are 
required to criminalize both the supply-side and the demand-side of bribery.93 As 
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previously mentioned, the demand-side of bribery refers to an official‟s request for 
payment in exchange for his favourable action, whereas the supply-side refers to the 
offer of payment by someone who is not an official but is seeking favourable treatment 
by the official.94 In addition, Article 16 also requires states to criminalize the bribery of 
officials of public international organizations.95   
Furthermore, Articles 6 and 36 of the UNCAC require all state parties to ensure 
the existence of bodies that prevent corruption through the implementation of policies 
and that combat corruption through law enforcement, respectively. The state parties are 
required by the UNCAC to grant these bodies the necessary independence to be able to 
carry out their functions effectively and without undue influence.96 It has been 
suggested that this is particularly important for such anti-corruption bodies because 
there is a need for them to remain independent of the bureaucrats and politicians whom 
they must often investigate. 
It is worth noting that the UNCAC plays a particularly important role in the fight 
against corruption because it is the only universally legally binding anti-corruption 
instrument.97 
 
(iii) OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 
The OECD took steps to fight corruption at an international level at the initiative 
of the US State Department.98 When the State Department officials initiated 
negotiations on bribery and corruption in the OECD their main objective was for the 
creation of a binding treaty, however, they eventually settled for a gradualist 
approach.99 This is because they realized the need to begin with only a form of „soft 
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law‟ such as the OECD recommendations and thereafter work their way up to binding 
legal instruments.100  
An ad hoc Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions which 
comprised of national government experts was established and its work led to a series of 
recommendations.101 In 1994, an OECD recommendation called upon member 
governments to take effective measures against transnational bribery.102 Thereafter, in 
1996 the OECD approved a second recommendation calling on member states to deny 
tax reductions for foreign bribes.103 In 1997, the OECD approved a third 
recommendation which called on members to put in place effective measures to deter, 
prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with 
international business transactions; in particular the prompt criminalisation of such 
bribery in an effective and co-ordinated manner.104 Finally, in 1997 the OECD Anti-
bribery Convention was adopted and it entered into force on 15 February 1998.105 There 
have since been additional OECD recommendations. This includes the 2009 OECD 
recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions which contains measures to assist state parties to 
better detect and prosecute foreign bribery and Good Practice guidelines on internal 
controls, ethics and compliance106.  
Like the UNCAC, the OECD Anti-bribery Convention seeks to criminalize the 
act of bribing foreign public officials and sets out in Article 1(1) what the offence 
entails as it states that: 
“Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to 
offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether 
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directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that 
official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in relation to the performance of official duties, in order to 
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business.”107 
The convention has been a great success as many of the industrialized countries 
which are members of the OECD have bound themselves to criminalise and prosecute 
foreign and international bribery accordingly, as a result of the convention.108  
The scope of application of the convention is however restricted. Unlike the 
UNCAC, the OECD Anti-bribery Convention only deals with the supply-side of 
bribery, or what has been referred to in some countries as „active bribery‟ which is the 
offence committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe, to the exclusion of 
„passive bribery‟, which is the offence committed by the official who receives the 
bribe.109 It has been suggested that pursuing the foreign officials who are involved 
would raise problems regarding jurisdiction and thereafter lead to interferences with the 
sovereignty of other states.110  
A key issue of concern however is enforcement.111 The continuing low number 
of prosecutions in the majority of states has raised some concerns. Although the 
convention has required states to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials, the 
convention makes no specific provision for enforcement institutions and measures; as a 
result, making the provisions effective has been a challenge.112 The OECD does 
however provide for a peer review process whereby each member state‟s policies are 
examined by the other members.113  
                                                          
107 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery Of Foreign Public Officials In International Business 
Transactions, 1997. 
108 Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Huberts Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement (2002) 336. 
109 Commentaries on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery Of Foreign Public Officials In 
International Business Transactions, 1997. 
110 Cyrille Fijnaut & Leo Huberts Corruption, Integrity and Law Enforcement (2002) 337. 
111 John Hatchard Combating Corruption – Legal Approaches to Supporting Good Governance and 
Integrity in Africa (2014) 256. 
112 Ibid at 257. 
113 „The OECD‟s peer review process – a tool for co-operation and change‟ available at 
http://www.oecd.org accessed on 4 November 2014.  
22 
 
Article 12 of the convention requires the parties to co-operate in carrying out a 
systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation of the 
convention.114 This section, therefore, establishes a peer review process.  
The peer review mechanism, in general, is conducted on a non-adversarial basis 
and it is described as a sophisticated way of monitoring and improving compliance with 
conventions.115 Within the framework of the OECD Anti-bribery Convention, the 
Working Group on Bribery is involved in the peer review process. The Working Group 
assesses the extent to which the principles of the convention have been incorporated 
into the national legislation of the member states, as well as the extent of their 
implementation and enforcement.116 The Working Group thereafter makes findings and 
recommendations in a report on how the relevant countries can improve implementation 
of the convention.117 The countries must then take action in response to the findings and 
recommendations and make follow-up reports on their progress.118  
Furthermore, the peer review mechanism has been described as being only a 
“soft enforcement system” unlike the traditional legal enforcement mechanisms.119 This 
could be due to the fact that the monitoring mechanism only has the effect of 
persuading states to implement the provisions.120 However, this persuasive effect 
illustrates that the peer review mechanism performs a very important function in 
enhancing compliance with the OECD Anti-bribery convention by the member states.121  
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(iv)  SADC Protocol Against Corruption 
There has also been co-operation in southern Africa, by the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), to combat corruption. SADC members agreed to 
take concrete initiatives, by way of a protocol, to fight corruption at the third Regional 
Roundtable meeting on Ethics and Governance which took place in Zimbabwe in the 
year 2000.122  In August 2001, the SADC Protocol against Corruption (hereafter 
referred to as „the Protocol‟) was signed by the heads of state of the SADC countries at 
a summit in Malawi; the Protocol eventually came into force in 2005.123 
The Protocol contributes to the fight against corruption in international 
commercial transactions by way of Article 6 which requires all SADC members to 
prohibit and punish the bribery of foreign officials as it states: 
“Subject to its domestic law, each State Party shall prohibit and punish 
the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its own nationals, 
persons having their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses 
domiciled there, to an official of a foreign State, of any Article of 
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or 
advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction 
in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official's 
public functions.”124 
Furthermore, Article 4 (1) (d) of the Protocol requires member states to maintain 
institutions to implement mechanisms for preventing, detecting, punishing and 
eradicating corruption.125 However, unlike the UNCAC, the Protocol makes no mention 
of the required level of independence of any such institution.  
Moreover, the Protocol does not provide for a peer review process as in the 
OECD Anti-bribery Convention. However, Article 11 of the Protocol does provide for a 
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committee to which the state parties are required to report, on a regular basis, regarding 
their progress in the implementation of the Protocol.126 Unfortunately, the committee 
has not yet been fully established.127 
It has been suggested that the reality that the SADC region is poor and has 
limited resources available to develop regional programmes and establish institutions 
relating to crime combating must be acknowledged when exploring the possibilities of 
increased international co-operation in the anti-corruption movement.128 
 
III. NATIONAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT CORRUPTION 
While attempting to fight corruption only within national economies and 
political boundaries is likely to be ineffective, the inverse will be true as well.129 It has 
thus been posited that international efforts to control transnational corruption will meet 
with little success unless they are supported by and co-ordinated with effective action 
against domestic corruption.130 Furthermore, this broad-based co-operation is 
considered necessary, not only to ensure effectiveness, but also to ensure consistency 
and fairness in the trade environment so that firms are able to do business on an 
equitable basis in various jurisdictions.131  
It is recognized that all countries share the responsibility to combat bribery in 
international commercial transactions.132 It is therefore unsurprising that legal reforms 
have been taken globally in multiple jurisdictions, in an attempt to fight corruption 
occurring in domestic and international commercial transactions. A few of these 
attempts at combating domestic corruption in different jurisdictions will be discussed 
below. 
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(i) Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
The US has taken initiative in fighting corruption through the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA). As previously mentioned, the FCPA was enacted by congress in 
response to the scandals that occurred in the 1970‟s.133 The FCPA, amongst other 
things, criminalizes the bribery of foreign public officials for the purposes of obtaining 
or retaining business.134  
It is suggested that because what constitutes a bribe and a grease payment or a 
facilitation payment depends on the country and business culture, US firms are placed at 
a competitive disadvantage.135 US firms have, therefore, questioned whether the FCPA 
is an obstacle to conducting business in foreign countries in which there are differing 
opinions what behaviour is acceptable in the course of business.136 
Many countries are of the opinion that it is inappropriate to criminalize bribery 
worldwide because it is embedded so deeply in some cultures.137 As a result, US firms 
tend to find themselves in a predicament whereby they must choose between either 
complying with regulatory requirements of the FCPA or conducting themselves in the 
manner customary to the particular country in which they are doing business and 
running the risk of being punished under the Act. 
The FCPA, however, does contain a facilitation payment exception which is also 
known as a grease payment exception.138 The Act does not criminalize „any facilitating 
or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party or party official the purpose 
of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine government action by a 
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foreign official, political party or party official‟.139 The exception is aimed at allowing 
firms to make certain payments to foreign public officials to perform routine tasks that 
fall within the ordinary scope of their duties.140 
Although many US firms hold the view that the inclusion of such an exception is 
important and necessary for remaining competitive in foreign markets, the global 
disapproval of facilitation payments can be easily illustrated by the absence of similar 
exceptions in many of the recent anti-bribery statutes and treaties worldwide.141  
Since 1977 the FCPA has applied to all US persons and firms and certain 
foreign issuers of securities. It has been suggested that the legislature in the 1970‟s was 
somewhat reluctant to also include the possibility of prosecuting foreign ministers, 
members of parliament and other foreign and international public officials involved in 
the corrupt practices, under the Act.142 However, in 1998 a number of amendments to 
the Act extended the scope of application so that the anti-bribery provisions also apply 
to such foreign persons and firms who cause, directly or through agents, an act in 
furtherance of such a corrupt payment to take place within the territory of the US.143 
There have only been a small number of cases in which the US has asserted its 
territorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals and firms, on the basis of violations of the 
provisions of the FCPA since the 1998 amendments.144 
A particularly noteworthy example of a case in which the US has exercised 
jurisdiction over a foreign person under the auspices of the 1998 amendments to the Act 
is US v Christian Sapsizian & Edgar Valverde Acosta.145 In this case, the Defendant, 
Christian Sapsizian who was a French citizen and employee of a French company 
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(Alcatel Inc.) was arrested in the US for violations of the FCPA.146 Mr. Sapsizian 
offered to pay a bribe to a senior Costa Rican government official who was a member of 
the board of the Institutio Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE).147 He offered to pay this 
bribe so that the ICE would award Alcatel the mobile telephone contract in Costa 
Rica.148 In furtherance of this scheme, Alcatel began to transfer money from its US 
bank account to an Alcatel consulting firm known as Servicios Notariales in Costa 
Rica.149 The consulting firm would then be instructed to make the payments to the 
Costa Rican government official on behalf of Alcatel Inc.150 On his arrest, Mr. 
Sapsizian was charged with, among other things, making payments to a foreign official 
in contravention of the FCPA.151 He was subsequently sentenced on September 23, 
2008 to 30 months in prison and he agreed to pay $261,500 to the US as part of his plea 
deal.152 
The FCPA empowers two enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), to impose severe penalties on 
companies and individuals that violate the provisions of the Act.153 The DOJ is 
responsible for civil and criminal enforcement with regards to domestic concerns and 
foreign companies and nationals, whereas the SEC is responsible for civil enforcement 
with regards to issuers of securities.154 
The FCPA was an important development in the US because it denoted a turning 
point; its robust provisions and onerous sanctions indicated that corrupt practices would 
no longer be taken lightly. However, the stringent provisions of the FCPA have led 
many US firms to view the Act as an impediment to doing business in the global 
market, especially in countries where what might constitute a bribe in the US, is merely 
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viewed as a routine transaction in the course of business.155 As mentioned above, this 
puts US firms at a serious competitive disadvantage in these countries because they are 
unable to engage in certain activities that are considered routine, without the risk of 
being punished under the FCPA.156 
 
(ii) Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
South Africa has also taken steps to fight corruption. It has done so through the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PCCA Act).157  
Section 5 of the PCCA Act creates a number of offences with regards to corrupt 
activities relating to foreign public officials.158 It specifies that any person who bribes a 
foreign public official to act personally or influences another person to act in a manner 
that is, among other things, designed to achieve an unjustified result or to act in a 
manner that amounts to any other unauthorized or improper inducement to do or not to 
do anything, is guilty of an offence.159 
Section 34 of the Act places a duty on certain persons to report the occurrence of 
corrupt transactions; any such person who fails to report such corrupt activities is also 
guilty of an offence.160 The reports anticipated in section 34 must be made to the 
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) which is also known as „the hawks‟ 
and is located within the South African Police Services (SAPS).161 The DPCI therefore 
plays a particularly important role in the anti-corruption framework in South Africa.  
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The DPCI was established by chapter 6 of the SAPS Act to investigate „priority 
crimes‟ and to replace the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO) which was also 
known as „the scorpions‟ and was located in the National Prosecuting Authority.162  
The disbandment of the DSO and subsequent replacement with the DPCI was, 
however, challenged in the Constitutional Court.163 The Act establishing the DPCI was 
successfully challenged on the grounds that the legislature violated a number of its 
obligations, including its obligation to maintain an independent anti-corruption unit.164 
It was contended that the location of the DPCI within SAPS resulted in its lack 
of independence and meant that the officials of the DPCI were merely ordinary police 
officers.165 The DPCI therefore did not enjoy any special job security.166 Furthermore, 
there were concerns that the DPCI was not sufficiently independent from political 
pressure and interference.167  
The Constitutional Court held that the offending legislative provisions 
establishing the DPCI were unconstitutional to the extent that they did not secure 
adequate independence and thereafter compelled parliament to reconsider and amend 
the legislation establishing the DPCI.168 In purported compliance with this decision, 
parliament enacted the SAPS Amendment Act on 14 September 2012.169  
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The importance of maintaining an independent body to combat corruption and 
organized crime within South Africa was therefore highlighted in this case as it was 
pointed out that the state had a Constitutional and an international obligation to do so.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the WTO has essentially refrained from participating in the anti-
corruption movement, it is clear that various other organizations across the globe have 
acknowledged the importance of working together to identify ways to fight corruption 
in an effective way, particularly in the realm of international business. A particularly 
crucial development that has been highlighted on a national and international level, in 
legal instruments and case law is the importance of maintaining and strengthening 
independent bodies in every jurisdiction to prevent and combat corruption through the 
implementation of policies and through law enforcement. While not all the international 
initiatives have resulted in binding obligations on member states, such efforts have, 
nevertheless, been necessary to strengthen co-operation with national governments - 




CHAPTER 4: THE WTO AND CORRUPTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As previously mentioned, bribery and corruption became international issues in 
the 1970‟s; following which numerous international organizations adopted conventions 
and other instruments designed to control bribery and corruption in international 
business, to the exclusion of the WTO.170  
Although the WTO has taken no action explicitly aimed at reducing corruption 
and other illicit practices, there are a number of existing provisions in the WTO rules 
that, although unintended, can be used to help members to counter corruption.171 This is 
because corruption is widely recognized by commercial actors within the members‟ 
territories as harmful to business opportunities.172 Most of these provisions do not target 
corruption specifically, but do so indirectly. These rules, at the very least, have the 
effect of reducing opportunities for corruption.173 
Bribery and Corruption loomed large all around the world during the period in 
which the WTO was formed.174 This tends to raise the question as to why these issues 
were not given a prominent place on the WTO agenda given the impact of corruption on 
international trade. This also raises the question as to whether, if at all, these issues 
should have been given such a place on the agenda. The reluctance by the WTO to 
address or condemn the issue of corruption has caused some controversy and is 
therefore worth exploring and investigating further. While some scholars are of the 
view that the WTO should include corruption control as part of its legal framework and 
thus adopt a more hands-on approach in the anti-corruption movement; others are of the 
view that dealing directly with the problem of corruption is not the business of an 
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organization such as the WTO.175 These views will be discussed in more detail in this 
chapter, as well as some of the WTO rules and practices that have been considered as 
having the potential to act as corruption counterweights.  
 
II.  THE WTO AND ITS FAILURE TO INCLUDE CORRUPTION AND 
BRIBERY ON ITS AGENDA 
In order to understand the WTO‟s reluctance to include corruption and bribery 
on its agenda, it is necessary to, firstly, have an understanding of the purpose and 
function of the organization and thereafter explore the possible reasons for its failure to 
do so. 
The WTO deals with rules of trade between nations. These rules are contained in 
the WTO agreements and they are essentially contracts binding governments to 
maintain trade policies and practices in accordance with the agreed limits.176 Everything 
the WTO has done since its formation is the result of negotiations, including these 
WTO agreements; they have been negotiated and signed by the WTO members.177   
It has been argued that the complexities of organizing the WTO as well as the 
heavy workload at the time when it was formed could have complicated any effort to 
address corruption and bribery.178 
 A significant problem that has also perhaps played a role in the WTO‟s failure 
to include corruption and bribery on its agenda is the absence of a true demanduer, that 
is, an influential private or public actor who is willing and able to initiate a campaign 
for new international rules, within the organization.179 It is apparent that many of the 
actors involved in the debate over corruption and bribery have preferred to take action 
in different fora and as such, action in the WTO has not been a priority to these 
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actors.180 In contrast to this, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the WTO‟s 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (which like 
corruption and bribery falls outside the traditional subject matter of international trade) 
were both backed by powerful and aggressive demandeurs.181 This seems to confirm the 
view that the success or failure of international rule-making depends to a large extent on 
the effort of the public and private actors that support the proposed action.182  
In addition, it is evident that where the policy-makers themselves are corrupt, 
they are likely to oppose international efforts to address the issue of corruption.183 An 
illustration of this is President Suharto of Indonesia, whose government was immensely 
corrupt and who was later involved in criminal proceedings on charges of corruption.184 
Unsurprisingly, President Suharto was one of the leading voices against WTO action on 
corruption, during the Singapore Ministerial Conference.185 
Furthermore, it has been posited that the longstanding tradition of making 
reciprocal concessions under the GATT and thereafter within the WTO has rendered the 
organization unsatisfactory as a rule-making body.186 This is because it is stuck in the 
quid pro quo thinking that has traditionally dominated tariff negotiations within the 
organization, even when asked to address important issues such as corruption and 
bribery, on which new international rules could potentially produce significant mutual 
benefits.187 This quid pro quo mentality of WTO members that dominates the 
negotiations makes it especially difficult to make progress on important issues because 
everyone wonders how they will be made to pay or what they will get in return.188 
Moreover, it has been suggested that because the WTO legal system has been 
held up as such a success, it has raised the bar for international agreements within the 
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organization to a level that may be counterproductive.189 This is because it is widely 
accepted by the members that WTO agreements should be made legally binding and 
subject to the WTO dispute settlement system as well the remedies associated with this 
system, that is, compensation and retaliation.190 As a result, the organizations rule-
making procedures offer few, if any, soft law alternatives similar to the 
recommendations that lead to the creation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.191  
The WTO members could benefit from adopting a soft law approach to 
addressing corruption in the context of international trade; for instance, by making a 
Ministerial declaration against corruption in international trade transactions similar to 
the Declaration against Bribery and Corruption in International Commercial 
Transactions which was adopted by the UN in 1997.192 Such a declaration would 
demonstrate that the organization will not tolerate corruption in international trade and 
would have the effect of stressing the importance, to each member, of playing an active 
role in the anti-corruption movement.  
Alternatively the WTO could begin by providing for recommended practices 
which member states would be encouraged to adopt, as well as guidelines which 
members could incorporate into their trade policies in an attempt to control corruption 
in international trade, just as the OECD has done. 
Another likely factor contributing to the WTO‟s disinclination to engage in the 
anti-corruption movement is the mistaken view that the campaign to eliminate 
corruption is a “North-South” issue, that is, it is a program imposed by industrialized 
states governments onto developing states governments.193 The President of Gabon, 
Omar Bongo, has even gone so far as to say that „corruption exists only in the minds 
and cultures of western developed nations‟ and alleges that „the word corruption does 
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not [even] exist in any language native to Gabon‟.194 Many of the legal 
recommendations for addressing corruption imitate the measures that already exist in 
the legislation of the industrialized states; the addition of these provisions to the WTO 
rules may be perceived as another instrument of economic dominance by the developed 
states over the developing states.195  
Moreover, questions have been increasingly raised about the true motives and 
driving forces behind these anti-corruption policies. This increased scepticism has led 
some to suggest that the international concern with corruption is not attributable to any 
substantive increase in corrupt practices but rather to the self-interest of Western states 
because of their interest in gaining greater market penetration.196 
Apart from the relationship between corruption and international trade, an 
important reason why the WTO can be seen as having such an important role to play in 
the anti-corruption movement is its wide membership and the fact that it is one of the 
few international organizations that have the ability to enforce its obligations.197 
There have been suggestions that the WTO should introduce new disciplines 
pursuant to the international anti-corruption movement.198 Some of these suggestions 
include making rules that require members to criminalize transnational bribery among 
the members themselves, as well as assisting other members in the prosecution of bribe 
payers and bribe takers.199 However, there exists a legitimate concern that the addition 
of new issues, such as corruption, puts the clarity of the WTO‟s mission and goals at 
risk and also risks overloading its agenda.200  
In addition to this, it has been argued that the WTO is not an institution inclined 
to impose a particular moral viewpoint on its members and the fight against corruption 
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is considered a moral issue among several of its members, hence its failure to explicitly 
address the issue.201  
Moreover, it has been suggested that any existing evidence that suggests that 
corruption has a negative impact on international trade is not sufficient to warrant a 
fully-fledged attempt by the WTO to combat corruption through the development of 
rules that aim to address corruption directly.202 
 
III. THE ROLE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE NORMS AND EXISTING WTO 
RULES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
In recent years, policymakers and scholars have come to the realization that 
corruption is an outcome of inadequate governance.203 Various governmental policies 
aimed at fighting corruption have been included as part of the “good governance” 
criteria put in place by the World Bank.204 There is no single conception of good 
governance and therefore no one right answer to achieving it.  
Good governance is sometimes used to describe the opposite of corrupt 
governance.205 It has been suggested that good governance in a country generally means 
that there is transparency and accountability in the decision-making and implementation 
processes, rule of law and that corruption is under control.206 Good governance policies 
such as accountability, fair competition and transparency are good for business in 
general and specifically for trade.207 
As previously stated, it is suggested that although not directly, the WTO 
obligates its members to act in ways that reflect the norms of good governance and that 
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these norms therefore spill over into the polity of anti-corruption as a whole.208 Some of 
the specific good governance norms that have been identified as being fostered by WTO 
rules include transparency, even-handedness (fair competition) and due process.209 The 
OECD lists the WTO disciplines that have potential anti-corruption effects in four 
categories. These categories represent the underlying principles of the trading system 
namely, non discrimination, transparency, predictability and limitations to arbitrary 
action.210  
Under the WTO rules policymakers are required to act in a fair and predictable 
manner in order to facilitate transparent trade-related policymaking and to provide due 
process in such policy-making by allowing individuals to comment on and challenge 
trade-related regulations before they are adopted.211 These requirements and obligations 
have been redefined as anti-corruption counterweights.212 
One of the purposes of the WTO‟s multilateral trading system is to facilitate the 
free flow of trade because it is important for economic development and well being. 
This entails removing obstacles to trade and ensuring that individuals, companies and 
governments know what the trade rules are around the world and giving them 
confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy, thus ensuring transparency 
and predictability – both important aspects of good governance.213 In this sense, the 
WTO members indirectly diffuse corruption and although it is not a traditional WTO 
issue, it is an international social evil and a cause for concern even in the realm of 
international trade. Accordingly, the WTO plays a very important role within the larger 
framework of the ongoing global anti-corruption movement.214  
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A number of rules in the various WTO agreements, in which some of the norms 
reflecting good governance are promoted and opportunities for corruption are thus 
reduced, will now be discussed. The agreements that will be the primary focus of the 
discussion are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA), the Agreement on Import Licensing (ILA), the Agreement on Pre-shipment 
Inspection (PSI) and the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). 
Moreover, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS 
Agreement), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the 
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT (Anti-dumping Agreement) 
will also be briefly discussed. 
 
(i) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
As previously mentioned, one important element of good governance is 
transparency, which is also one of the pillars of the multilateral trading system.215 
Transparency in any government is widely viewed as a necessary condition to 
effectively control corruption.216 Increasing transparency and reducing arbitrariness in 
trading nations is one of the raisons d’être for the WTO.217 The WTO defines 
transparency as the degree to which trade policies and practices, and the process by 
which they are established are open and predictable.218  
The provisions of Article X of the GATT embody the fundamental principle of 
transparency. In furtherance of the fundamental principle of transparency, Article X: 1 
requires that all trade-related laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative 
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rulings should be published promptly in order to enable members and traders to become 
acquainted with them.219 Article X: 2 goes on to state that none of these measures shall 
come into force until they have been so published.220 These provisions reflect the very 
essence of transparency, ensuring clear disclosures of vital information to traders and 
members in order to promote participation and also ensuring accountability. 
Furthermore, the provisions of Article X of the GATT also embody the 
fundamental principle of due process. With regards to the principle of due process, 
governments are required to accord due process rights to market actors and this is made 
effective through Article X:3 (b).221 In terms of Article X:3 (b), contracting parties are 
required to maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the 
purpose of prompt review and correction of administrative actions relating to customs 
matters.222 This allows traders to lodge complaints and appeals when necessary, perhaps 
including in instances where there are allegations of the existence of corrupt 
practices.223   
The WTO, therefore, contributes to the anti-corruption movement by providing 
a forum for members where the problems associated with a lack of transparency and 
due process in administration or implementation of measures (such as rules, judicial 
decisions or administrative rulings) are acknowledged and effectively addressed.224 The 
WTO website confirms this view when it states that the WTO commitments encourage 
good government.225  
The jurisprudence of Article X of the GATT as developed by the WTO dispute 
settlement body (DSB) is relatively wide. There have been several adopted panel 
decisions involving Article X of the GATT to date. A wide range of countries at 
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different levels of economic development have invoked Article X in the DSB, including 
Argentina, India, Brazil and the United States.226 It has been suggested that the diversity 
seems to demonstrate the growing consensus among members, of the importance of 
transparency in the administration of trade measures.227 It has also been suggested that 
Article X of the GATT would be a good starting point for the WTO to address 
corruption but it would require a broadened scope and greater adherence by members 
would have to be secured.228 
Another important element of good governance is fair competition or even-
handedness, which is also one of the pillars of the multilateral trading system. This 
principle of even-handedness is reflected in the non-discrimination rules provided for in 
Articles I and III of the GATT. The WTO is built on the ideal of non-discrimination and 
corruption is clearly in violation of this principle because of its tendency to deepen 
inequality.229  
Articles I and III of the GATT, namely the most-favoured-nation provision and 
the national treatment provision, together constitute the non-discrimination rules of 
international trade in the WTO.230 Article I prevents members from discriminating 
between members by requiring them to accord the same advantages, favours, privileges 
and immunities (with regards to customs duties and charges) to the like products 
originating in or destined for the territories of all of the other members.231 This can 
prevent corruption at the border by preventing customs officials from treating some like 
products more favourably than others in exchange for the payment of a bribe.  
Furthermore, Article III prevents members from discriminating between 
domestic and foreign like products (with regards to internal taxes and charges) and from 
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according treatment less favourable to foreign like products than that which is accorded 
to the domestic like products; that is to say that all WTO members are to trade on a 
level playing field.232  
The importance of ensuring fair competition has been expressed by the 
Appellate Body in some cases brought before the dispute settlement body. For instance, 
in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, the Appellate Body stated that “Article III 
obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for 
imported products in relation to domestic products”.233 The Appellate Body reinforced 
this stance in Korea - Beef, in which it further stated that the imposition of a drastic 
reduction of commercial opportunity to reach, and hence, generate sales to consumers 
and the resulting establishment of competitive conditions less favourable for foreign 
products, in comparison to domestic like products, is a violation of Article III: 4.234 
These provisions clearly operate to secure an environment that is in direct contrast to 
that which is fostered by corruption, that is, one that is characterized by inequality. 
 
(ii) General Agreement on Trade in Services 
The principle of transparency is also promoted in Article III of the GATS which 
requires members to publish promptly, all relevant measures of general application 
which pertain to or affect the operation of the GATS.235 This Article is a replication of 
the provisions provided for in Article X: 1 of the GATT, made applicable to trade in 
services. Furthermore, Article III requires members to inform the WTO Council on 
Trade in Services about the introduction of any new laws, regulations or administrative 
guidelines, or any changes to existing laws, regulations or administrative guidelines that 
affect trade in services.236 It is suggested that this oversight by the Council and also the 
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subjection to the dispute settlement mechanism reinforces the preventative potential of 
such rules, with enforcement powers.237 
Moreover, administrative transparency is promoted in Article VI:2 (a) of the 
GATS which requires all members to maintain or institute judicial, arbitral or 
administrative procedures which provide for the prompt review of and appropriate 
remedies for administrative decisions affecting trade in services.238 These transparency 
provisions can place service providers in a position to resist demands for bribes. 
In addition to this, like the GATT, this agreement promotes fair competition by 
its inclusion of non-discrimination obligations in which it provides for most-favoured-
nation treatment in Article II and national treatment in Article XVII.239 However, the 
principles under this agreement are handled slightly differently from the GATT. 
Article II:1 of the GATS prevents members from discriminating between 
members by requiring members to accord immediately and unconditionally, to the 
services and service providers of all members, treatment that is no less favourable than 
that which it accords to the like services and service providers of any other member.240 
However, unlike the GATT, the GATS members are allowed to maintain measures 
inconsistent with the most-favoured-nation treatment, thereby effectively discriminating 
between members with regards to services and service providers, provided that such 
measures are listed in the Annex on Article II exemptions, as provided for in Article 
II:2.241 Members were entitled to list these measures in the Annex on Article II 
Exemptions until the date of entry into force of the Marrakesh Agreement.242 
Furthermore, Article XVII requires members to accord to services and service 
providers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and 
service providers.243 However, unlike under the GATT, the national treatment 
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obligations under the GATS apply only to the extent that the members have committed 
themselves to grant such treatment, in respect of specific sectors that they have 
specified in their Schedule‟s of Concessions.244 These commitments are often subject to 
conditions and qualifications which are also provided for in the Schedules.245 
 
(iii) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
The principle of transparency is also promoted in TRIPS as it contains a blanket 
transparency provision in Article 63, which among other things requires the publication 
of all laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings in order to enable 
governments and other right holders to become acquainted with them.246 This Article 
also allows members who have reason to believe that their rights under the agreement 
have been affected, the opportunity to request access to or information on specific 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings.247 It has been argued that the culture 
fostered by TRIPS in requiring the provision of such information could lead to less 
success in demands for bribes by officials.248   
Furthermore, like the GATT and GATS, this agreement promotes fair 
competition by its inclusion of non-discrimination obligations. Article 3 and 4 of the 
agreement provide for most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment. Under 
this agreement the principles are also handled slightly differently from the GATT and 
GATS.249 The non-discrimination provisions under TRIPS relate to fair treatment of the 
nationals of member states, rather than goods or services.250 
With regards to national treatment, Article 3 requires members to accord to the 
nationals of other members, treatment that is no less favourable than that which it 
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accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property.251 
However, this obligation is made subject to the exceptions provided for in the Paris 
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971) and the Rome Convention.252 
Article 4 which provides for most-favoured-nation treatment places an 
obligation on members to the effect that any advantage, favour, privilege and immunity 
(with regard to the protection of intellectual property rights) granted to the nationals of 
any country must be immediately and unconditionally granted to the nationals of all 
other members.253 There are however certain exceptions to this obligation, which are 
enumerated in Article 4.254 
 
(iv) Agreement on Government Procurement 
This agreement applies to the procurement of goods, services or a combination 
of the two, by public authorities.255 The WTO has pointed out that this particular 
agreement promotes good governance in the participating member economies.256 This is 
evident where the agreement commits members to certain core disciplines regarding 
transparency and fairness in the public procurement sector. It is the only agreement that 
contains provisions directly aimed at fighting corruption to a limited extent. The aim of 
the agreement is to open up, as much as possible, government procurement markets to 
international competition and to help eradicate corruption in the public sector. 257 The 
preamble to the agreement recognizes the “importance of transparent measures 
regarding government procurement, carrying out procurements in a transparent and 
impartial manner and avoiding conflicts of interest and corrupt practices, in accordance 
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with applicable international instruments, such as the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption”.258  
It is widely accepted that procurement processes have the propensity to attract 
corrupt practices. The reason for this is that the nature of procurement is such that a 
small number of officials have substantial discretion over the granting of contracts that 
are worth large sums of money.259 Therefore, it is the combination of these factors - few 
officials, broad discretion, complex contracts and large sums of money - that fosters an 
environment for corrupt practices.260  
It has been suggested that the temptation for the officials to take a portion of 
these large sums of money for themselves in such instances is colossal; however, the 
chances of detecting these corrupt practices are low.261 Thus, corruption tends to 
manifest where an official‟s authority is combined with an environment of opaqueness 
and unaccountability such as that of the procurement process.262 In response to the 
inclination of government procurement processes to attract corruption, there have been 
several initiatives to reduce corruption in this sector; the most recognizable instrument 
among WTO members is the GPA.263  
A particularly notable provision of the GPA is Article IV: 4 of the agreement 
which places an obligation on procurement entities to conduct procurement in a 
transparent and impartial manner that prevents corrupt practices.264 This provision 
requires some positive action, on the part of these entities, to prevent corruption and not 
mere avoidance.265 This is evidently a step in the right direction for the WTO. This is 
because it appears to have finally taken a stance in the anti-corruption movement, by 
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condemning corruption within the realm of public purchasing. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that the duty of impartiality imposed by this provision is general in 
application, thus parties are not to treat any supplier preferentially.266 Where corruption 
is detected in a procurement process, the provisions of the dispute settlement 
mechanism may be invoked on the basis of a violation of the agreement.267 The 
agreement has therefore made it clear that corruption in government procurement 
contracts is at odds with the rules of the agreement.268  
Nevertheless, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement. This is quite a setback as it 
means that only a limited number of members are bound by the GPA.269 The Marrakesh 
Agreement draws a distinction between the multilateral agreements of the WTO and the 
plurilateral agreements.270 The multilateral agreements are accepted as a single 
undertaking, in that the agreements in their entirety are binding on all members; 
whereas plurilateral agreements are not binding on all members as they only create 
rights and obligations for those members who have accepted them.271 
Several plurilateral agreements have been negotiated and concluded among 
various WTO members; perhaps the same avenue could be considered, in an effort to 
control corruption in international trade, by those members with a desire to take a stand 
against trade-related corruption. 
 
(v) Agreement on Import Licensing  
The Agreement on Import Licensing has defined import licensing as 
“administrative procedures used for the operation of import licensing regimes requiring 
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the submission of an application or other document (other than that required for 
customs purposes) to the relevant administrative body, as a prior condition for 
importation into the customs territory of the importing member”.272  
It is suggested that such licensing regimes have the effect of fostering 
corruption, for instance, where licenses are in limited supply; economic actors are more 
inclined to make efforts, including illegal efforts such as bribing the relevant officials, 
to receive them.273 The provisions in this agreement are indirectly aimed at reducing 
corruption in the form of bribery of foreign officials.  
The provisions seemingly increase transparency and predictability; for instance, 
in Article 3.3 of the agreement, members are required to publish sufficient information 
for traders to know the basis on which licenses are granted and/or allocated.274 
Furthermore, according to Article 3.4 of the agreement, where a member grants a 
possibility for persons, firms or institutions to request exceptions or derogations from 
the licensing requirements, the member is required to publish such information.275 This 
ensures that where there is a suspicion that certain persons, firms or institutions have 
received a license where no exceptions or derogations from the rules have been 
published and have therefore received such licenses as a result of bribery or other 
similarly illicit practices, there is an opportunity for other members to make a violation 
claim with regards to these transparency provisions within the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism.276  
 
(vi) Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection 
The Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection states that pre-shipment activities 
are those that relate to the verification of the quality, quantity, price and/or customs 
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classification of goods to be exported to the territory of the user member.277 The 
inspection takes place in the territory of the exporting country. It has been suggested 
that the pre-shipment inspection procedures can also be used in a way that fosters petty 
bribery, for instance, because the inspection officials, to a large extent, have complete 
authority over the duration and the outcome of the inspections.278 As a result, bribes can 
be offered and demanded in order to speed up the inspection or to alter the findings of 
the quality, quantity, price and classification of the shipment.279  
The notable corruption counterweight that can be found in this agreement is 
transparency. The preamble to the agreement places emphasis on the desirability to 
provide for transparency of the operation of the pre-shipment entities, laws and 
regulations.280 In addition to this, Articles 2.8 and 3.2 of the agreement require members 
to publish their laws and regulations relating to pre-shipment activities.281 Furthermore, 
Article 2.6 of the agreement provides that any additional procedural requirements or 
changes to the existing procedures will not apply to a shipment unless the exporter was 
informed of the changes at the time when the inspection date was being arranged.282 
Moreover, another provision in the agreement with the potential to reduce corruption is 
Article 4, which provides for the right to independent review of the inspection results.283 
The object of such reviews is to establish whether in the course of the inspection in 
dispute, the parties complied with the provisions of the agreement.284  The review 
mechanism provided for in the agreement clearly aims to promote a culture of 
responsibility and accountability in the course of pre-shipment inspections.  
However, despite the existence of these provisions, a World Bank research 
group conducted a study on the impact of pre-shipment inspections on corruption and 
found that there was less customs fraud in one of the countries that was studied, but no 
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significant change in another country that was studied.285 Therefore, there is still some 
uncertainty as to whether the provisions of the agreement are in fact capable of reducing 
corruption.286  
 
(vii) The Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
The Trade policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) stipulates that the purpose of the 
mechanism is to contribute to improved adherence by all members to the rules, 
disciplines and commitments that were made under the multilateral and the plurilateral 
trade agreements, by achieving greater transparency in the trade policies and practices 
of members.287 The TPRM further expresses that the members recognize the value of 
“domestic transparency” as it states: 
“Members recognize the inherent value of domestic transparency of 
government decision-making on trade policy matters for both Members' 
economies and the multilateral trading system, and agree to encourage 
and promote greater transparency within their own systems, 
acknowledging that the implementation of domestic transparency must 
be on a voluntary basis and take account of each Member's legal and 
political systems.” 
As previously mentioned, transparency plays a pivotal role in combating 
corruption. It has been suggested that for the battle against corruption to succeed, there is a 
need to create a culture that respects transparency because it is the culture of secrecy and 
lack of information or access to information that allows corruption to take hold and 
increase.288  
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The WTO allows members to acknowledge and implement certain core values that 
are directly opposed to the culture of secrecy.289 The TPRM is the main transparency 
mechanism of the WTO and has been described as the “looking glass” through which 
members examine each other‟s trade policies and practices.290  
Part A of the TPRM stipulates that “the function of the review mechanism is to 
examine the impact of a member‟s trade policies and practices on the multilateral 
trading system”.291 Since corruption and other illicit practices are de facto barriers to 
trade in many countries and therefore have an impact on the multilateral trading system, 
it has been suggested that the reviewers ought to report on corrupt practices.292 Where 
the policies and practices of the members appear to distort trade during these reviews, 
the members can be challenged in a trade dispute.293 This creates the impression that 
even corrupt practices that have the effect of distorting trade are included within the 
scope of practices that can be challenged in a trade dispute.  
However, it is apparent that in the past, the reviewers have not considered 
themselves at liberty to refer to the subject openly as there have only been “subtle, well-
disguised references to corruption” in some of the trade policy review reports.294 
Nevertheless, now that various other international organizations are speaking openly 
about corruption, it is important for the reviewers to feel more confident in raising the 
issue as well.295 This is because the TPRM is undeniably a potentially useful tool for the 
members to investigate and identify any corrupt trade practices taking place in the 
territories of their fellow members. A number of other international organizations have 
also made use of similar peer review mechanisms, for instance, the OECD peer review 
mechanism which has been used by the OECD member states to monitor and ensure 
compliance with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The WTO could adopt a similar 
approach under the TPRM and publish any findings of corruption in the course of a 
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review, in an attempt to put pressure on members to take the necessary steps to combat 
trade-related corruption in their territories.  
 
(viii) Other WTO Agreements 
Essentially all WTO agreements contain transparency requirements, requiring 
members to publish and notify other members of all measures taken under the various 
agreements. In addition to those discussed above, there are also transparency 
requirements provided for in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures 
(SPS Agreement), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) and the 
Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of GATT (Anti-dumping Agreement).   
The transparency provisions in the SPS Agreement are provided for in Article 7, 
which requires members to notify all other members of any changes in their sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures and requires them to provide information on their sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures in accordance with the provisions contained in Annex B.296  
The TBT Agreement also provides for transparency requirements in Article 2 
which requires members to promptly publish all technical regulations that have been 
adopted or to otherwise make them available, for the purposes of enabling other 
members and interested parties to become familiar with them.297 
The transparency provisions in the SCM Agreement are found in Article 22, 
which requires members to provide a public notice and an explanation of certain 
determinations made, to those members who are subject to investigations under the 
Agreement and to other interested parties known to have an interest therein.298 
Furthermore, Article 25 of the SCM Agreement requires members to notify all other 
members of any subsidy programme they have put in place.299  
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Moreover, Article 12 of the Anti-dumping Agreement also requires members to 
provide a public notice and an explanation of certain determinations made under the 
agreement, to those members who are subject to anti-dumping investigations.300  
 
IV. ACCESSION TO THE WTO  
As previously stated, there are some WTO rules that seem to “reduce 
opportunities for corruption”.301 However, some academics have even gone so far as to 
suggest that the mere accession and subsequent membership of countries in the WTO 
will help their governments to push through reforms that may be important for reducing 
corruption.302 This is because when countries accede to the WTO agreements they are 
pressured by the other member states to make changes that ensure that their policies 
accord with WTO rules, including those that are concerned with or promote norms of 
good governance.303  
Furthermore, it is evidenced that the transparency obligations of the WTO 
extend beyond the text of the WTO agreements as additional transparency and good 
governance provisions are found in the Protocols of Accession to the WTO.304 For 
instance, upon accession, Nepal agreed in its protocol of accession to increase 
provisions for transparency and public comment, while Georgia promised that from the 
date of accession, its laws would provide for the right to appeal administrative rulings 
on matters subject to WTO provisions to an independent tribunal.305 Another important 
example is the protocol of accession of the Republic of China. China‟s transparency 
obligations in its protocol of accession included a commitment to enforce only the laws 
and regulations pertaining to goods, services and intellectual property that are published 
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and made readily available to other WTO members.306 It also included an obligation to 
establish an official journal for publication of all such laws and to provide appropriate 
authorities within a reasonable period of time for comment before such measures are 
implemented.307 Although studies have concluded that WTO membership might reduce 
corruption, membership alone is not sufficient.308 This is because an expectation that the 
WTO agreements alone could address the bulk of trade-related corruption is highly 
optimistic; trade-related corruption is a complex phenomenon and requires rules that are 
far more specific to corruption than the existing WTO rules. 
 
V. LIMITATIONS OF THE WTO FRAMEWORK IN ADDRESSING 
CORRUPTION 
Although the existing WTO rules that provide for transparency, non-
discrimination and due process are considered as counterweights to corruption, it is 
clear that they cannot do much more than create a trading environment that is less 
conducive to corruption. This is unsurprising as these WTO rules were drafted without 
direct consideration of the problem of corruption and this makes them particularly 
difficult to apply to individual instances of corruption.309 Furthermore, it is questionable 
whether these provisions are sufficient to effectively address incidences of trade-related 
corruption. This is because there is a very limited range of provisions in the WTO 
agreements that can apply to trade-related corruption and these existing provisions are 
capable of addressing only a small portion of the corrupt practices that occur in the 
realm of international trade, that is, mainly customs administration.310 
There are various practical difficulties that may arise in attempting to use the 
WTO framework to address individual instances of corruption. For instance, where 
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there is a tendency of customs officials to demand bribes from firms for the purposes of 
clearing shipments, those firms would not be able to bring a complaint directly to the 
WTO dispute settlement body (DSB), they would have to request their governments to 
bring a complaint against the member state in which the customs officials have 
demanded the bribes.311 If the government does not consider it to be in the country‟s 
interest, economically or politically, to bring such a complaint, it may refrain from 
doing so. Furthermore, proceedings in the DSB tend to be extremely costly.312 This 
raises a concern that even if the DSB was authorized to hear complaints based on trade-
related corruption, it is possible that the mechanism would not be utilized by the 
members.313 The mechanism would rather be reserved for cases whereby the bribes in 
question were sufficiently large and frequent to have a political and economic impact on 
the country that justifies the expenses associated with filing a complaint.314  
Moreover, it would be difficult to successfully bring a complaint for corruption 
based on the existing rules in the WTO dispute settlement body. This is because, 
although a particular instance of corruption might fall under the scope of an existing 
provision, the WTO may not have the required resources or expertise to address it.315 
This is because the WTO is characterized by people with expert knowledge in 
international economic law rather than white-collar crimes.316 As a result, it is 
questionable whether the WTO could tackle a complaint based on corruption in a 
meaningful way, on account of this lack of knowledge. Furthermore, it is suggested that 
the WTO does not currently have sufficiently extensive fact-finding powers to 
investigate and decide on corruption complaints.317  
                                                          
311 Article 3 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
stipulates that the purpose of the DSB is to settle disputes between members of the WTO; not private 
individuals and firms.  
312
 Collette Van der Ven „Should the WTO Outlaw Transnational Bribery?‟ available at http://www. 




315 Collette Van der Ven „Should the WTO Outlaw Transnational Bribery?‟ available at http://www. 
globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/07/18/should-the-wto-outlaw-transnational-bribery/ accessed on 11 
November 2014. 




It has been posited that if the DSB is to be used by members to address 
individual instances of corruption on the basis of the existing WTO provisions, there is, 
at the very least, a need for these provisions to be strengthened.318 One suggested 
avenue is that the WTO should stipulate that the acceptance or solicitation of bribes by 
government officials, while conducting any duties that fall under the WTO agreements, 
will constitute an infringement of a WTO obligation.319 This will have the effect of 
creating an anti-corruption obligation that is enforceable in the DSB.320 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As noted in the discussion, the existing WTO provisions clearly set some limits 
on what bureaucrats and other economic actors in the trading sector can do and how 
they do it.321  Although the rules in the WTO agreements seem to have the potential to 
reduce opportunities for corruption, it is still questionable if these provisions do, in 
reality, have any impact on corruption. Furthermore, it is clear that despite the existence 
of these rules it would be quite difficult to bring a dispute based on bribery or 
corruption in the WTO due to the fact that the rules of the various agreements (except 
the GPA) were drafted without direct consideration of the issue of corruption. This 
makes the application of the existing rules difficult in corruption cases thus it is 
uncertain whether governments would even be allowed to challenge instances of 
corruption before the DSB. As a result, the WTO has been called upon to recognize the 
fight against corruption as one of its responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is widely accepted that corruption is an obstacle to international business.322 
However, the linkage between corruption and international trade is not a clear one and it 
is not always easy to identify. Nevertheless, it is one that exists and cannot be ignored. 
It is therefore necessary to understand this linkage due to the detrimental impact that 
corruption can have on international trade. The thesis aimed to develop an 
understanding of the relationship between the two phenomena, as well as the role that is 
played by various organizations, especially the WTO, in fighting corruption in 
international trade. This chapter summarizes the lessons that have been learnt in the 
thesis.  
The thesis explored the various forms that corruption can take, the negative 
effects that corruption tends to have on international trade and the implications thereof. 
It also discussed the need for a collaborative approach to fighting corruption on a global 
level.323 In this regard, the thesis explored the various instruments that have played a 
part in fighting corruption in international trade, both on an international level - under 
the auspices of the UN, the OECD and SADC - as well as on a national level, by 
countries such as the United States and South Africa.  
In addition to this, the thesis discussed the WTO‟s failure to include trade-
related corruption - a de facto barrier to trade - as an issue on its agenda, as well as the 
possible reasons for this.324 Trade-related corruption was excluded from the agenda in 
spite of the fact that the WTO is the central organization that deals with international 
trade rules and has trade liberalization i.e. the removal of trade barriers, as one of its 
central goals. Moreover, the thesis included an overview of the existing WTO rules that 
have the potential to act as corruption counterweights. 
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The literature review to a large extent shows that there are mixed views among 
scholars with regard to the question of whether corruption does, in fact, have a 
detrimental effect on trade and if so, whether the WTO should make rules that 
specifically target corruption in international trade. On the one hand, some scholars are 
of the opinion that reforms to reduce corruption in international business will require 
trade law reforms, thus it is necessary for the WTO to do more than be a bystander in 
the international anti-corruption movement.325 On the other hand, others hold the view 
that the WTO should refrain from addressing the problem of corruption directly and its 
involvement in the anti-corruption movement should be limited to indirect efforts.326 
The one view that appears to be unanimously held by the scholars is that the 
existing WTO rules cannot do much more than reduce opportunities for corruption by 
providing for good governance norms.327 These norms have the effect of creating a 
trading environment that is transparent, that affords fair conditions of competition and 
ensures due process.328 
The WTO rules that provide for these good governance norms can be found in 
essentially all the agreements that have been negotiated and concluded since the 
inception of the WTO. Although these rules address corruption indirectly, there are still 
a number of difficulties associated with attempting to use the WTO framework to 
address individual incidences of corruption in international trade. In particular, there are 
various obstacles that could arise if members sought to resolve disputes concerning 
corruption, within the DSB. 
In view of the undeniable existence of a link between corruption and 
international trade and the undesirable impact on international trade thereof, it is 
submitted that it is indeed necessary for the WTO to adopt a more hands-on approach to 
reducing trade-related corruption.  
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It is, therefore, recommended that the WTO should play a more active role in 
tackling trade-related corruption, over and above the existing rules in the WTO 
agreements. In this regard, the WTO should make a Ministerial Declaration 
condemning corruption in general, and more specifically, corrupt practices that may 
occur in the realm of international trade.  
Furthermore, the WTO should recommend practices for the members to adopt 
and guidelines for them to incorporate into their national legislation. This will assist 
members to control bribe paying and soliciting in their customs administration, and any 
other corrupt practices that may occur in the sphere of international trade.  
Moreover, the WTO should make use of the TPRM rather than the DSB, as a 
tool to persuade members to take steps specifically aimed at controlling trade-related 
corruption within their territories. This can be done in the course of the reviews, by 
monitoring the extent to which the members have made any such anti-corruption efforts 
and subsequently publishing the findings of the relevant reviews in an attempt to hold 
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